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RELIGIOUS VALUES AND CLIENT-THERAPIST MATCHING IN 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 
MARK R. McMINN 
Oregon Health Sciences University 
Portland, Oregon 
A recent debate on the roles of religious values in psychotherapy has focused on 
global issues rather than more meaningful issues of client-therapist matching. This 
debate is reviewed and the concept of religious value matching is introduced. As an 
example of the systematic variation in one's values as a function of religion, guilt 
accepting ( G +) and guilt repressing (G-) values are considered. The four possible 
client-therapist matching categories are discussed and outcomes are considered 
from a tripartite model. Finally, recommendations for religious value matching and 
ethical implications are discussed. 
Since the publication of Eysenck's (1952) 
evaluation of traditional psychotherapeutic 
effectiveness, the outcome issue has been a 
frequently considered topic for research and 
conceptual debate in the field of clinical psy-
chology. While not all investigators have 
concluded, as Eysenck, that spontaneous 
recovery is at least as effective as psycho-
therapy, (see Bergin & Lambert, 1978; 
Smith & Glass, 1977; Strupp, 1963) there 
has not been unequivocal evidence which 
clarifies the magnitude of effectiveness of 
psychotherapy. One possible reason for the 
lack of such evidence is the inadequacy of 
traditional research designs in assessing the 
outcorneissue (Parloff, 1979; Strupp, 1982). 
Al~ss global, more idiographic· (i.e. which 
therapist<\Vith which treatment for which 
client) approachto outcome evaluation may 
resultin a better understanding of the out-
come and process of psychotherapy (see 
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Strupp, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c; Strupp & Had-
ley, 1977). 
One aspect of the trend away from global 
research design in outcome evaluation has 
been the consideration of client-therapist 
matching (Luborsky, Auerbach, Chandler, 
& Cohen, 1971; Strupp, 1980a, 1980b, 
1980c). Certain components of a particular 
therapeutic alliance may have positive or 
negative effects on the eventual outcome. 
An effort to understand important dimen-
sions of client-therapist matching may lead 
to an increased understanding of the vari-
ance in past outcome research and, more 
importantly, of the significant aspects of the 
therapeutic alliance which lead to behav-
ioral, cognitive, and affective changes. 
A recent debate on the role of religious 
values in The Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology (Bergin, 1980a, 1980b; 
Ellis, 1980; Walls, 1980) has focused on a 
global issue rather than more meaningful 
idiographic issues in much the same way as 
psychotherapy outcome research. The 
practical relevance of religious values in 
psychotherapy exists primarily at the level 
of client-therapist matching, and not at the 
universal level described by authors on both 
sides of the debate. 
Subsequent to reviewing the debate on 
religious values in psychotherapy, a position 
stressing the importance of matching reli-
gious values will be presented using the 
issue of guilt resolution as an example. Fi-
nally, recommendations for the implementa-
tion of religious value matching will be pre-
sented. 
The Religious Value Debate 
The argument presented by Bergin 
(1980a) was that "until the theistic belief 
systems of a large percentage of the popula-
tion are sincerely considered and concep-
tually integrated into our work, we are un-
likely to be fully effective professionals" (p. 
95). The structure of his argument consisted 
of six theses some of which were countered 
by the arguments of Ellis (1980) and Walls 
(1980). 
First, Bergin stated that "values are an 
inevitable and pervasive part of psycho-
therapy" (p. 97). As Strupp (1980d) points 
out, the traditional psychodynamic view 
that the therapist's values should play no 
role in therapy is unrealistic and can even be 
harmful. Implicit in Bergin's first thesis is 
the assumption that religious values are, 
either directly or indirectly, among those 
values which do affect psychotherapy. In 
contrast, religious values were not directly 
included in Strupp's (1980d) set of essential 
values for psychotherapists. 
Bergin's second thesis was that profes-
sional change processes are affected by 
value-laden factors. This thesis was pre-
sented as little more than a statement of the 
relevance of nonspecific factors in psycho-
therapy outcome (see Frank, 1971). The 
second thesis implicitly assumes, however, 
that religious values are a significant part of 
the set of nonspecific factors which lead to 
therapeutic change. 
The third thesis was a source of disa-
greement for Ellis (1980) and Walls (1980). 
Bergin stated that two systems of values, 
humanism and clinical pragmatism, are 
dominant in the mental health professions. 
Both value systems, said Bergin, exclude 
religious values. While the general state-
ment of the thesis is difficult to disagree 
with, Bergin's listing of specific values 
found within the clinical-humanistic system 
was perceived as unsatisfactory by Walls 
and Ellis. Bergin contrasted this list with a 
set of theistic values derived from religious 
writings. Walls (1980) stated: 
Bergin developed his theistic values by careful selec-
tion from religious writings. An equally discerning 
extraction is needed to compile an exemplary list of 
humanistic values. (p. 640) 
Ellis (1980) presented an alternative list of 
values representative of the humanistic val-
ues of probabilistic atheists. In a reply to 
Ellis and Walls, Bergin (1980b) explained 
that his intention was to present a set of 
values which have become prominent in a 
form of ''degraded'' humanism, rather than 
the traditional humanistic values. 
The disagreement over the third thesis of 
Bergin is illustrative of a common problem 
in any comparison of value systems - a 
tendency to state the preferred value system 
in a positive light and the contrasting value 
system in a negative light. The careful 
statement of theistic values and the under-
statement of humanistic values by Bergin 
shows this bias from the theistic perspec-
tive. 
A similar bias can be seen from the 
humanistic perspective when Strupp 
(1980d) cites the writings of Fromm to sup-
port the view that traditional religion is 
authoritarian, has the goals of promoting 
powerlessness and obedience, and results in 
a prevailing mood of sorrow and guilt. In 
contrast, Fromm writes that humanistic 
religion has the goals of strength and virtue 
and results in the mood of joy. It is unlikely 
that Fromm's statements of religious values 
would find any more agreement among 
theists than Bergin's statements have found 
among humanists.1 
1 Just as humanists do not share a common set of values 
(as evidenced by the responses to Bergin's third thesis), 
theists do not necessarily hold identical values (Palout-
The fourth thesis of Bergin (1980a) was 
that values of mental health professionals 
are in contrast with values of the population 
in general. Bergin stated that 90% of the 
general population possesses some sort of 
belief in the existence of God. This is in 
contrast to the 50% of AP A members with a 
similar belief. Bergin noted the discrepancy, 
but did not suggest a specific response for 
psychotherapists. From Bergin's statement, 
Walls (1980) inferred a response. 
Bergin's case seems to rest on the contentions that 
psychotherapists have an obligation to include theistic 
values as part of their own value systems in order to 
incorporate the public definition of "good" into thera-
peutic goals. (p. 640) 
This inferred response of tailoring "our 
values to fit those of the general public" (p. 
641) does perhaps go far beyond the intent of 
Bergin. Bergin's point may be better stated, 
in terms of Strupp and Hadley's (1977) tri-
partite model, that a comprehensive state-
ment of treatment goals must include a 
consideration of the values of the client and 
values within the client's social system as 
well as the therapist's own values. 
It is likely that Walls would also object to 
this milder interpretation of Bergin's fourth 
thesis. He intimates that therapists' values 
are in some way superior to those of clients. 
The fact cited by Bergin that, in general, the values of 
psychotherapists differ from the public's is not alarm-
ing; it is encouraging. Psychotherapists are involved in 
making value decisions that affect their clients and 
exercise considerable power. We should both expect 
and demand that the values of psychotherapists be 
more carefully reasoned and, on the whole, more ade-
quate than the values of the general public. Assuming 
that mental health is an issue concerned with values, 
what could we offer if our values were not in some way 
more adequate than those of the clients who seek our 
help? (p. 641)2 
zian, Jackson, & Crandall, 1978). Psychotherapists 
may recall anecdotal evidence of the sorrowful, guilty 
religious clients they have seen. The existence of such 
theists cannot be denied. However, the existence of 
humanists with similar symptoms is also difficult to 
deny. Therefore, the merits of theism or humanism 
should not be determined by the biased client samples 
of psychotherapists. 
2 ln addition to placing an arbitrary significance on the 
values of the therapist, this statement includes the 
unsubstantiated assumption that humanistic values are 
more carefully reasoned than theistic values. Cogent 
As will be subsequently discussed in this 
article, this egocentric placement of the 
therapist's values above the client's values 
and/or society's values may result in an 
inaccurate assessment of outcome and may 
obfuscate appropriate client-therapist 
matching. 
The fifth thesis of Bergin (1980a) was that 
because of the first four theses, clinicians 
should openly acknowledge the fact that 
they are implementing their own value sys-
tems. In addition, clinicians should be 
explicit about what values they hold, but 
only in the context of respect for the value 
systems of others. This thesis, which calls 
for open acknowledgment of one's own val-
ues and the role of those values in psycho-
therapy, is the basis of the model of client-
therapist matching which will be presented 
in a subsequent section of this article. 
The sixth thesis presented by Bergin 
(1980a) was that intuitive value systems 
should be transformed into hypotheses 
which can be openly tested and evaluated. 
Bergin listed nine such hypotheses which 
could be subjected to empirical analyses. 
Ellis (1980) concurred with Bergin's sixth 
thesis by offering alternative hypotheses for 
four of the nine suggested by Bergin. This 
scientific approach has opened the door for 
an empirical contribution to the debate of 
the role of religious values in psycho-
therapy. Nonetheless, the issue is funda-
mentally more than a scientific issue. It is 
unlikely that the experimental method will 
ever resolve the debate. 
To summarize this review of the recent 
debate on the role of religious values in 
psychotherapy, two points must be re-em-
phasized. First, implicit in the first two 
theses of Bergin's (1980a) argument was the 
assumption that religious values are similar 
to other values operating in a client-therapist 
relationship. Since this assumption.was not 
attacked by Bergin's critics, and since some 
assumptions are presently necessary to con-
evidence for therationalba.sis of theistic values is llot 
difficuWtd find(McDoweU, 1975, 1979), 
sider the applicability of religious values to 
psychotherapy, I will continue with Ber-
gin's assumption for the purpose of this arti-
cle, although on a more explicit level. 
Second, overstatements and generaliza-
tions have contaminated the appropriate 
consideration of religious values in psycho-
therapy. Bergin's presentation of clinical-
humanistic values has been criticized by 
several authors (Ellis, 1980; Strupp, 1980d; 
Walls, 1980) as misrepresenting the essence 
of humanism. On the other hand, Fromm 
(see Strupp, 1980d) has misrepresented 
theistic values and Walls (1980) has claimed 
near sovereignty of the humanistic position 
while misinterpreting Bergin as saying that 
therapists should adjust their personal val-
ues to fit the values of the public. It is my 
contention that these overstatements on 
both sides of the issue have directed our 
attention away from the more meaningful 
question, namely, What role do the religious 
values of the therapist vis-a-vis the client 
play in the therapeutic alliance and/or out-
come? 
Therapeutic Orientations to Guilt 
It is evident from the debate just reviewed 
that therapists differ in their views of reli-
gious values. It is clear that differences in 
religious values affect viewpoints on the na-
ture or existence of God, the nature of per-
sonal identity, the definition oflove, the role 
of guilt in personal distress, and many other 
personal and interpersonal issues (Ellis, 
1980). For the purposes of this analysis only 
one of these issues- the role of guilt resolu-
tion in psychotherapeutic outcome- will be 
considered. This issue will be evaluated at 
both a conceptual and a clinical level. 
Conceptual Analysis 
On a conceptual level, guilt is perceived 
by many theists as a potential change agent. 
Bergin (1980a) lists the following as a theistic 
value: "Personal responsibility for own 
harmful actions and changes in them. 
Acceptance of guilt, suffering, and contri-
tion as keys to change. Restitution for harm-
ful effects'' (p. 100). 
In contrast, guilt is perceived by many 
humanists as a detrimental factor which 
must be reduced in order to produce change. 
Ellis (1980) lists the following as a clinical-
humanistic-atheistic value: 
Personal responsibility for own harmful actions and 
changes in them. Maximizing responsibility for harmful 
and immoral acts and minimizing guilt (self-damnation 
in addition to denouncing one's acts). No apology or 
"cop-out" for effects of one's unethical behavior. 
Restitution for harmful effects. (p. 636) 
In sum, guilt accepting values (G+) ate 
typical of theists and guilt suppressing val-
ues (G-) are typical of humanists. This is not 
intended as a categorical classification, but 
rather as a statement of general tendencies 
of values toward guilt. 
Clinical Analysis 
The effect of guilt in therapeutic outcome 
has been considered by previous writers. 
Ellenberger ( 1966) traced the pathogenic ef-
fects of" secrets" through history. Mowryr 
(1973) suggested that the stress leading to 
personality disorder is caused by dis-
honesty, irresponsibility, and unconcern for 
others. Mowrer (1960) writes: 
For several decades we psychologists looked upon the 
whole matter of sin and moral accountability as a great 
incubus and acclaimed our liberation from it as epoch-
making. But at length we have discovered that to be 
"free" in this sense, i.e. to have the excuse of being 
"sick" rather than sinful, is to court the danger of also 
becoming lost. This danger is , I believe , betokened by 
the widespread interest in Existentialism which we are 
presently witnessing. In becoming amoral, ethically 
neutral, and "free," we have cut the very roots of our 
being; lost our deepest sense of self-hood and identity; 
and, with neurotics themselves, find ourselves asking : 
Who am I? What is my destiny ? What does living 
(existence) mean? (p. 303) 
As a solution to this "moral crisis ," 
Mowrer (1972) has developed a group 
therapy approach which he labels integrity 
groups. This therapeutic approach empha-
sizes honesty, responsibility, and mutual 
concern. There has been empirical (John-
son, Dokecki, & Mowrer, 1972) and anec-
dotal (Mowrer & Veszelovszky, 1980; 
Smrtic, 1979) evidence supporting 
Mowrer's claims of a connection between 
psychopathology and moral accountability, 
but according to Mowrer and Veszelovszky 
(1980), the evidenc1e has been selectively ig-
nored by psychologists. 
Other writerSt have suggested that guilt 
itself rather than the actions leading to guilt, 
is a ~ause of psychopathology. Ellis (1960) 
writes: 
If, in this thoroughly objective, non-guilty manner, we 
can teach our patients (as well as the billions of people 
in the world who, for better or worse, will never become 
patients) that even though human beings can be held 
quite accountable or responsible for their misdeeds, no 
one is ever to blame for anything, human morality, I am 
sure, will be significantly improved and for the first time 
in human history civilized people will have a real possi-
bility of achieving sound mental health. The concept of 
sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neuro-
tic disturbance. The sooner psychotherapists forth-
rightly begin to attack it the better their patients will be. 
(p. 192) 
it is understandable that Ellis' position on 
the role of guilt in psychopathology would 
lead him to the G- therapeutic orientation 
which was discussed earlier. The reduction 
of guilt, independent of the guilt-producing 
action, would be expected to result in thera-
peutic change. In contrast, a therapist hold-
ing Mowrer's position of the role of guilt-
producing behavior in psychopathology 
would embrace the G+ orientation. The 
resolution of the guilt by changing the guilt-
producing action would be expected to re-
sult in therapeutic change. 
Hence, two generalized therapeutic 
orientations can be characterized by their 
proposed treatment of guilt. The G + orien-
tation begins with the premise that be-
haviors which produce guilt also produce 
stress and eventually psychopathology. 
Therefore, guilt feelings are useful in identi-
fying those behaviors which can be altered 
to produce therapeutic change. The G-
orientation begins with the premise that guilt 
itself produces psychopathology and there-
fore it must be reduced, with or without 
changing behaviors, in order to provide 
therapeutic change.3 
The G+ orientation is consistent with 
theistic values as they are described by Ellis 
( 1980). This is not to say, however, that all 
theists hold the G+ orientation or that all 
humanists hold the G- orientation. 
The point of this analysis is not to argue 
intuitively or to review empirical evidence in 
an attempt to verify the validity of the G+ or 
G- orientation. Rather, I will attempt to dis-
cuss the implications of matching therapists 
and clients, each having their own guilt 
orientation. Clearly, the results of each 
matching combination is best stated as an 
empirical hypothesis rather than a logically 
predictable outcome. 
Therapist-Client Matching 
The four possible combinations of thera-
pist-client matching on guilt orientation will 
be considered within the tripartite frame-
work of outcome evaluation (society, 
individual, professional) suggested by 
Strupp and Hadley (1977). Of course, not all 
clients seen in therapy are facing problems 
of guilt feelings. Some are experiencing guilt 
feelings, but the guilt would be described as 
irrational by virtually everyone. For exam-
ple, a client may be experiencing guilt feel-
ings because of the behavior of a grown child 
over whom the parent has no control. Like-
wise, a client may report guilt for a past 
event with irreversible consequences, such 
as the suicidal death of a parent or spouse. In 
such cases a realistic goal of any effective 
treatment is to reduce the feelings of guilt 
independent of present behaviors because 
present behaviors are inconsequential to the 
guilt-produ~ing e~~nt. In other cases, how-
ever, •. gt1iltfttlillgs ~te·'•presented ··by the 
client,Which coexist with behaviors which 
cause or exacerbate feelings. The subse-
to . these clients 
feelings which 
or socially pro-
r~~~~J®k~~ei~;~~\~~~~f.:n,~~~: of the be-
.n net1av•or on the basis of 
~;¢xtfa-'mliliital relationship or on the 
underlie the relationship. 
Matching Category One (Th:G+; C:G+) 
This is perhaps the most congruous of the 
four categories. Not only are the therapist 
and the client aligned with similar orien-
tations regarding the role of guilt, but society 
also is predisposed toward a similar orien-
tation. Bergin's (1980a) fourth thesis is evi-
dence of the current theistic value system of 
American society. As we discussed earlier, 
the theistic value system is consistent with a 
G+ orientation. 
Throughout therapy, the therapist and the 
client will work together to change guilt-
producing behavior. As that therapeutic 
goal is reached, the client's feelings of guilt 
will give way to feelings of self-efficacy. The 
therapist will consider the outcome success-
ful as he or she observes a change in the 
client's responsibility (Kaiser, 1955) and the 
client will consider therapy successful be-
cause of the cessation of guilt. Societal 
expectations will be met by the client's in-
creased responsibility and the client may 
become a more productive member of soci-
ety because of the affective changes. Since 
all three outcome criteria result in positive 
assessments of the therapeutic effects, this 
first matching category is considered very 
successful. 
Matching Category Two (Th:G+; C:G-) 
This situation might arise when a client 
comes to a G+ therapist with a desire to 
"feel less guilty" but with no interest in 
making behavioral changes. Alternatively, 
the client may be willing to change his or her 
behavior, but may perceive no connection 
between the presenting complaint (guilt feel-
ings) and the therapeutic approach (be-
havior change). Under these conditions, the 
outcome will be generally unsuccessful. 
The therapist will attempt to reduce the 
client's guilt by changing the behavior. If the 
clit:mt is unwilling to change, a therapeutic 
stalemate is immediately reached. If the 
client is willing to change, but sees no 
connection between behavior change and 
the troubling guilt feelings, there may be a 
motivational deficit on the part of the client. 
In either situation, behavior change is slow 
or absent. 
From the perspective of the therapist, the 
outcome is not favorable because the client 
has made no progress toward guilt resolu-
tion via behavior change. From the perspec-
tive of the client, the outcome is not favor-
able because the guilt feelings have never 
been a direct target of change in therapy. 
From the perspective of society, no change 
has occurred because neither the behavior 
nor the guilt feelings have been altered. 
Since none of the outcome criteria result in 
positive assessments of the therapeutic ef-
fects , this second matching category is con-
sidered very unsuccessful. 
Matching Category Three (Th: G-; C:G+) 
This category is characterized by the 
client who is plagued by guilt feelings , be-
lieves those feelings to be the direct result of 
behavioral patterns, and thus comes to a 
therapist with a G+ orientation. In contrast 
to the client, the therapist believes the be-
havior to be independent of the guilt feel-
ings. From the therapist's perspective, the 
guilt feelings must be reduced while the be-
havior may or may not be a problem. 
One ofthe therapist's goals, as noted in 
quotes cited earlier by Walls and Ellis, is to 
transform the client's value system to con-
form to the therapist's values which are per-
ceived by the latter to be more rational. The 
client's "irrational" connection ofbehavior 
and guilt will gradually be eroded and the 
G- orientation will develop in the client. 
Apart from any ethical implications of im-
posing values upon clients,4 therapists need 
to consider the interpersonal tension and 
41 am not attempting to naively assert that clients ' val-
ues do not or should not change during therapy. Rather, 
as will be noted later, I am suggesting that t<Ythe extent 
possible, clients should be given a choice as to which 
therapist's values they will expose themselves to . 
Clients who share common religious values with their 
therapists may find more support for peripheral value 
changes in their own social milieu than clients who are 
not matched with their therapists on religious values. 
This assumes that some value changes fostered by 
therapists vary with religious values, as is the case with 
guilt orientation. 
dysphoria that such an imposition may 
cause when the values being changed are 
religious in nature. For many individuals, to 
change basic religious values requires either 
changes in massive social support systems 
or the acceptance of chronic inner turmoil. 
By changing a client's values on the causes 
of guilt, for example, dissonance may be 
created in religious values, in family rela-
tionships, and in interpersonal relation-
ships. Graham (1980) states the point well: 
Quite early in the treatment process, the patient begins 
to use words like good and bad, and it is our tendency as 
therapists to diminish the intensity of these words since 
they relate to a value system within the individual which 
has led to the current state of stress. My own personal 
view of the last thirty years of psychotherapy is that we 
have collectively done an excellent job of diminishing 
the demonstration of good and bad and a very poor job 
of replacing these concepts with acceptable definitions 
which allow the individual self-acceptance and peace. 
(p. 370) 
From the perspective of the therapist, the 
outcome might be quite successful with this 
matching category. The client has adopted 
the therapist's values toward guilt and can 
verbally deny the guilt feelings which caused 
the client to initiate therapy. From the 
client's perspective, however, the long-term 
effectiveness of therapy may be negligible or 
even negative. In order to achieve equilibri-
um in those areas oflife thrown awry by his 
or her value changes, the client may be up-
rooted with the long-term result of more dis-
comfort than was initially ' experienced. 
From the perspective of society, the out-
come could range from positive to quite 
negative, depending upon the client's 
satisfaction and the degree of social stress 
caused by the client's change of values. 
One other possible outcome must be con-
sidered. If the client refuses to accept the 
values of the therapist, then the outcome can 
be assessed in the same way as Matching 
Category Two. 
Since only one of the outcome criteria 
(therapist) clearly results in a positive 
assessment of the therapeutic effects, and 
the other outcome criteria may result in 
negative effects, the third matching category 
is considered unsuccessful. 
Matching Category Four (Th:G-; C:G-) 
This category is characterized by the 
client who--does not perceive a necessary 
connection between guilt feelings and be-
havior and who goes to a therapist with the 
same guilt orientation. The behavior of the 
client may or may not be an issue in therapy. 
The therapist will attempt to reduce the 
client's guilt feelings by emphasizing their 
common values of the irrationality and 
non-productivity of guilt. The client will not 
need to change existing support systems to 
accommodate the therapist's values. 
From the perspective of the therapist, the 
outcome will be favorable as the client re-
duces the self-imposed guilt feelings. From 
the client's perspective, the therapy will be 
successful since the guilt feelings have been 
reduced. If the reduction of guilt feelings 
does positively affect behavior (a supposi-
tion of Ellis that is not yet empirically clear), 
then the outcome will be favorable from the 
perspective of society as a whole. If the 
reduction of guilt does not affect behavior, 
then the outcome will be neutral from the 
societal perspective. Since two or three of 
the outcome criteria are assessed positively, 
the fourth matching category is considered 
successful. 
In sum, the outcome is most favorable 
when the therapist and the client are of the 
same guilt orientation. Since guilt orien-
tation is a variable which tends to differ 
systematically with religious values, it is 
reasonable to suspect that outcome is posi-
tively affected wheri the client and the 
therapist share co~Illonreligiot1s ;alues. As 
mentioned earliel':>§uilt resolution js only 
one dimension ofmany on which people dif-
fer orlthe · · · values. There 
bemariyberief'its./in additiOn to obtain-
ly, to choose whether their specific values 
will be evaluated by therapists with similar 
general religious values. To do otherwise is 
to impose a belief that the therapist's set of 
religious values is superior to the religious 
values of others and, perhaps more signif-
icantly, to deny the existence of an entire 
social support system in which the client's 
religious values are intertwined. Therapy 
may then become an exercise in proselytism 
without consent. 5 
Recommendations for Religious 
Value Matching 
At this point it will be helpful to discuss 
the potential application of religious value 
matching. A radical interpretation of the 
position which I have taken in this article 
would be that I am suggesting clients and 
therapists must be from the same church 
affiliation or, on the other hand, that thera-
pists should make no attempt to change their 
client's values. This is not what I am 
suggesting, but rather, that general values, 
including religious values, which may affect 
psychotherapeutic outcome should be 
openly discussed in the early stages of 
therapy, especially if there is a significant 
discrepancy between the therapist's values 
and the client's values. 
It is widely accepted that therapist's val-
ues do affect the values of their clients 
(Strupp, 1980d; Walker, Ulissi, & Thurber, 
1980; Weisskopf-Joelson, 1980). To suggest 
that this value transfusion should not occur 
would be to deny a basic element of therapy. 
Rather, I am suggesting that the full implica-
tions of the value transfusion should be con-
sidered prior to the onset of therapy. 
As practitioners, psychologists know thatthey bear a 
heavy social responsibility because their recommenda-
tions and professional actions may alter the lives of 
others. They are alert to personal, social, organi-
zational, financial, or political situations and pressures 
that might lead to misuse of their influence. (Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists, 1981, p. 663) 
5This is not meant as a condemnation of persuasion in 
the therapeutic process, as long as the client is in-
formed. Persuasion without prior consent, however, is 
not the proper activity of psychotherapists and should 
be left to evangelists and activists. 
As was previously discussed, to change a 
client's religious values may result in signif-
icant conflicts in his or her social milieu. 
These possible changes need to be con-
sidered prior to their occurrence. 
Who is to decide which clients will be 
harmed by an attempt to change their reli-
gious values? The Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists (1981) suggest an answer to 
this question: 
Psychologists respect the integrity and welfare of the 
people and groups with whom they work. When con-
flicts of interest arise between clients and psychol-
ogist's employing institutions, psychologists clarify the 
nature and direction of their loyalties and responsibili-
ties and keep all parties informed of their commitments. 
Psychologists fully inform consumers as to the purpose 
and nature of an evaluation, treatment, educational, or 
training procedure, and they freely acknowledge that 
clients, students, or participants in research have free-
dom of choice with regard to participation. (p. 636) 
Potential clients are to be ultimately 
responsible for the choice of participation 
after they have been fully informed. Hence, 
the following recommendations are offered 
with the understanding that the application 
of these recommendations are possible only 
in some employment and therapeutic situa-
tions. 
1. In conducting intake interviews, 
psychologists recognize first, the relation-
ship, if any, between the client's presenting 
complaint and religious value issues, and 
second, the complexities of interacting reli-
gious values and, when appropriate, seekto 
assess the religious value systems of the 
prospective client. While some clients may 
not be able to clearly articulate religious val-
ues, most will be able to respond to probing 
questions which are carefully designed to 
evaluate religious values. 
2. During the beginning phases of 
therapy, psychologists attempt to 
communicate their own religious values in a 
clear manner to those clients whose therapy 
may beaffected by value issues. In addition, 
the potential complications of conflicting 
religious values are openly discussed with 
clients. In some cases, especially with in-
sight-oriented psychotherapies, it may be 
countertherapeutic for a therapist to recite 
religious values early in therapy. Even in 
these cases, however, the psychologist can 
be specifically listening for areas in which 
religious value conflicts might jeopardize a 
positive outcome. With long-term intensive 
psychotherapy, it will be important to 
understand these conflicts early on in 
therapy so that appropriate alternatives can 
be considered. 
3. As the psychologist's and client's reli-
gious values are revealed, the client's choice 
to continue or discontinue therapy is dis-
cussed openly. As usual, if either the psy-
chologist or the client chooses to discon-
tinue therapy, the psychologist offers refer-
ral information when possible. This is not to 
say that a major portion of each therapy 
session be devoted to religious values, espe-
cially if the client's presenting problem 
bears no obvious connection to religious 
values. From time to time during the initial 
phases of therapy the religious value match 
could be considered by the therapist and 
discussed with the client only if appropriate. 
In most cases, the above recommenda-
tions would serve to assess conflicts (such as 
described earlier in Matching Categories 
Two and Three before the therapeutic pro-
cess begins, and therefore would potentially 
avoid ineffective or negative outcomes due 
to religious value conflicts. Several diffi-
culties in the implementation of these 
recommendations deserve to be mentioned. 
1. Most individuals, including therapists, 
believe that their own religious orientation is 
right. The above recommendations are diffi-
cult in that they necessitate giving the client 
a free choice even though the therapist per-
ceives his or her own value system as the 
correct one. 
2. The above recommendations assume 
that therapists have a working relationship 
with other therapists of different religious 
orientations to whom they can refer clients. 
For many therapists, this is already the case, 
but for others it will be necessary to begin to 
work with professionals with disparate reli .. 
gious views. 
3. In settings where the intake inter~ 
viewer is not the potential therapist, an open 
communication of religious values between 
the therapist and the intake psychologist will 
be necessary. Further, an accurate 
presentation of the therapist's religious val-
ues to the clients may at times be the 
responsibility of the intake psychologist, 
even though his or her own religious values 
may differ from the therapist's values. 
As areas of inappropriate client-therapist 
matching are delineated and alternatives 
suggested, it is hoped that outcomes in 
psychotherapy will be positively affected. 
The sacrifice of psychotherapists who must 
give up dogmatic efforts to persuade the 
"fanatic" or the "ungodly" without consent 
is perhaps a small price to pay for upholding 
our ethical commitment to our clients' free-
dom of choice. 
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